Provoking conflict?

For some time PPT has been concerned that the political strategy adopted by the Democrat Party and the government that it leads has been increasingly repressive.

A party that has come to government by the combined actions of the military and royalists is inevitably underpinned by the forces that have backed authoritarian regimes for several decades.

We have pointed to the government’s use of lese majeste and computer crimes laws to limit freedom of expression in the media and more broadly.

These laws have also been used to intimidate and lock up opponents of the royalist regime. PPT has repeatedly pointed out that the Democrat Party-led government has used the Internal Security Act to limit the right to legal protest.

Several times we have pointed out that the government has glaring double standards, selectively applying laws when it acts against perceived opponents while supporting allies.

PPT has also been concerned about the language that has been used in recent days to attack opponents, in particular noting the increased tendency to label political opponents as traitors.

We have observed that the government and its allies, most especially rightists and the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), have been using ultra-nationalist discourses to attack opponents and to ramp up anger and xenophobia against “traitors” who do not support “Nation, Religion and Monarchy.”

PPT has pointed out that these calls have, in previous years, resulted in violence, and we pointed to events in the 1973-76 period, which ended with a massacre of students at Thammasat University, led by extreme rightists imbued with royalist, anti-communist and nationalist propaganda that revolved around concocted and exaggerated “stories” sometimes peddled by the mainstream media (on 1976, go here for a PDF).

PPT is therefore disturbed to see similar trends developing in 2009. In an earlier post, we discussed the alleged car bomb threat to Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.

We pointed out that back on 15 July 2006, when there were reports of an assassination plot against Thaksin Shinawatra, a spokesperson for the Democrat Party was dismissive. And in August 2006,

when the government claimed a failed car bomb assassination attempt against Thaksin, with arrests made and a bomb displayed, there was widespread skepticism, including from the Bangkok Post and other mainstream media.

Academics urged the government to resist using the “plot” as a pretense for repression.

We asked: where is that skepticism now? Where are the academic protectors of human rights?

By the way, it is reported that the “Chiang Mai Provincial Court Monday rejected police’s request for an arrest warrant against a local red-shirt on ground that police’s evidence is too weak.”

Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Taugsuban has added to the choking feeling of deja vu that is enveloping Thailand.

In the Bangkok Post (23 September 2009: “Govt: Aliens banned from protests”) he is reported to have stated that the “government believes the red-shirt United Front for Democracy against Democracy (UDD) is planning to use foreign workers to swell the numbers at its planned anti-government rallies…”.

The government has set about warning “employers that foreign labourers would not be allowed to take part in the series of protests planned to begin on Nov 29 …”.

Suthep warned that the “government will take legal action if they fail to comply, because only Thai people have the right to voice their political opinions…”.

PPT emphasizes this last point because we do not believe that we have seen this point stated previously. All of those foreign commentators in Thai newspapers had better be on guard from now on.

More seriously, this statement by Suthep is reprehensible for two other reasons. First, it targets migrant workers, arguably the most marginalized and exploited group in Thailand, and does so in a way that could engender hatred against them.

Second, as a correspondent to Bangkok Pundit notes, this move has scary resonances with 1976 massacre, when it was rumored that the Thammasat students had been infiltrated by Vietnamese communists.

As the Democrat Party and the government moves once again to invoke the Internal Security Act, PPT is coming to the conclusion that the government is provoking conflict. We are yet to be convinced that this is a deliberate strategy.

It may be that the government is simply piling up repression and provocation and is unaware of the cumulative impact.

More seriously, it could also be that the strategy is, as PAD speakers urged, a strategy aimed at “traitors” that means finally and “quickly finish[ing] them off for the sake of our beloved King and ancestors, so that Thais stop quarrelling with one another because of these scoundrels.”

AHRC and RWB on computer crimes as lese majeste

On 20 November 2009, the Asian Human Rights Commission released a timely statement on the use of the Computer Crimes Act as a substitute for the lese majeste law and Reporters Without Borders released a report the day before criticizing

the use of this and other laws that are meant to control and limit expression: “Harassment and intimidation are constantly employed to dissuade Internet users from freely expressing their views.”

Read the report on RWB at Prachatai, where some extra and useful links are included.
As PPT readers may have noticed, at our pages on Pending Cases and About Us, we also recognized this substitution.

Some months ago we began including those charged with “national security” offenses under the Computer Crimes Act along with lese majeste cases.

AHRC mention five cases: the royals health rumors scapegoats Thatsaporn Rattanawongsa (arrested just a couple of days ago), Thiranan Vipuchanun, Khatha Pachachirayapong and Somjet Itthiworakul

(arrested earlier in November), Prachatai’s webmaster Chiranuch Premchaiporn, charged back in March, and Suwicha Thakor, arrested in January, convicted in April and sentenced to 20 years jail, reduced to 10 after he finally agreed to plead guilty.

RWB list others, including Nat Sattayapornpisut, arrested in October.
AHRC makes some excellent points, noting that negative publicity “over the cases against persons critical of its royal family,

or persons claiming to act on the royals’ behalf” has caused the Democrat Party-led government to change tack and downplay lese majeste while using other means to repress and censor.

It is added that the Justice Minister Pirapan Salirathavibhaga remarkably claimed that “Offences against the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the Regent are considered offences relating to the security of the Kingdom,

not ‘lese-majesty’… I am certain that each state as well as Thailand has its own way of interpreting what constitutes offences relating to national security.

Therefore, whoever violates the law of the Kingdom will be fairly charged and prosecuted according to the law of the Kingdom.”

As AHRC points out, the Computer Crimes Act “is an excellent substitute” for a repressive government that wants to appear to international community as one that favors the “rule of law.” As is clear, they use this law to harass, intimidate and to lock up those who oppose the national ideology.

AHRC notes that the Computer Crimes Act “was passed in the final hours of the military-appointed proxy legislature following the 2006 coup, and … was designed as a tool to suppress dissent, not responsibly deal with Internet crime in Thailand.

Its ambiguous provisions, notably the section under which all these persons have been charged, allow for the prosecution of any type of thought crime on the disingenuous pretext that the crime is one of technology rather than one of expression or of ideas.

Therefore, the state can claim that it is bringing people to court for one type of crime, while sending a clear message to a society that the real offence is altogether different.”

A country for old men?

With so much happening in Thailand’s politics in the past few weeks, it has been difficult to keep up. Seeing the bigger picture is a challenge.

Following our retrospective on Thailand three years after the 2006 palace-military coup, where we attempted to be positive, we now offer some observations regarding the current situation.

We begin with the police chief debacle. Why has this appointment been so drawn out and so conflicted? Of course, there are the related views that Thaksin Shinawatra controls the police or that the police support Thaksin.

Another view is that there was a tug-of-war going on between coalition partners. There is truth in both perspectives. However, PPT suggests that there is more to this dispute.

Reports suggest that Privy Council President General Prem Tinsulanonda (b. 1920) is at work. We won’t go into great detail for Bangkok Pundit has collected some of the comment on the police chief saga and most especially on the latest debates on who should get the job, including from ASTV/Manager and the Bangkok Post (17 September 2009: “New twist in police drama”) where there were guarded comments “new influential players.”

Police General Jumpol Manmai, the “alternative” candidate is known to be close to Prem and The Nation (17 September 2009: “Top Cop : Deadlock remains”) had stated that Jumpol “is known to have very strong backing outside the Police Commission, and lobbying was said to have reached fever pitch in the past few days.”

So is it Prem who is lobbying? Probably. Why? We suggest it is because, for some years, the palace and Privy Council have been trying to get increased control over the legal system. There has been a heightened urgency to this in the battle to root out Thaksin and his “regime.” Retired judges have been brought onto the Privy Council.

In what has clearly been a deliberated strategy, five of the last seven appointments to the Privy Council have been from the courts. The odd ones out were Admiral Chumpol Patchusanont (Former Commander of the Royal Thai Navy) and General Surayud Chulanont, who was appointed after he left the army and stepped down to be premier appointed by the military and then went back to the Privy Council when that guest appearance ended.

The former judges on the Privy Council are: Sawat Wathanakorn (appointed 18 July 2002 and a Former Judge of the Supreme Administrative Court); Santi Thakral (15 March 2005, Former President of the Supreme Court of Justice); Ortniti Titamnaj (16 August 2007, Former President of the Supreme Court of Justice); Supachai Phungam (8 April 2008, Former President of the Supreme Court of Justice); and Chanchai Likitjitta (8 April 2008, Former President of the Supreme Court of Justice and Minister of Justice).

That so many judges are appointed send a clear message regarding intent. The king’s speeches to judges confirm the palace’s intentions. That such links to the judiciary have been put to use in the battle against Thaksin is seen in the ample evidence of meddling in the courts.

The palace has also been keen to have its people at the top of the police. In recent years, Police General Seripisut Temiyavet was said to be a palace favorite. When the military took over in 2006, Seri was made acting and then Police Commissioner and became a member of the junta’s Council for National Security.

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Protecting Prem

Political Prisoners in Thailand
August 24, 2009

PPT recently posted on the king’s call for unity. As might have been expected, the ruling Democrat Party has now used this call to support its own position (see MCOT English News, 23 August 2009: “Ruling Democrats urge public to observe King’s concerns for unity”).
Democrat Party spokesman (and recent investor in property developer Quad Co Ltd – PPT meant to point this out earlier, but neglected it) Buranaj Smutharaks “asked the people to heed His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s concerns regarding the lack of unity and cooperation in society and to use Parliament as the solution and means to achieve solidarity.” We have posted on Buranaj previously, here and here. as a spokesman supportive of the use of laws against freedom of speech, including lese majeste and the Computer Crimes Act; he also attacked foreign commentators and academics who opposed such draconian laws.
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New: Linking health rumors to Thaksin

November 4, 2009

The Nation (5 November 2009: “We’re closing in on rumour-mongers : police”) has a somewhat garbled report on the arrest    and bailing of the third suspect in the king’s health rumor case, Somjet Itthiworakul.

 

The story has some information on Somjet. He is said to be the owner of a snooker bar in Chon Buri who allegedly posted unverified assertions that led to a stock market plunge last week is the link who will lead to the arrest of those behind rumour-mongering and their accomplices, a senior police officer said yesterday.”

Somjet reportedly admitted” posting the items on his computer,     but claimed he did not send them out on the Internet…”. It is unclear what this might mean. The police seem to think he did circulate material. When and where is not explained.

The point of the story seems to be that Somjet ” is a key suspect who is possibly aware of those behind [the rumours]”.However      he seems to have no connection to the other two arrested suspects.

Meanwhile, the attempt to link the rumors to Thaksin Shinawatra continues. Businessman, former Ponzi scheme manipulator and 

anti-Thaksin activist Ekkayuth Anchanbutr raised the issue of “  who had benefited from the plunge on October 14 as a result of rumours, especially in state-regulated funds including the Social Security Office and the Government Pension Fund.”

He said “a  person identified as Jor who managed an  overseas  stock market and was a relative of powerful people living outside Thailand who had bought large quantities of stocks.”He says     these people made “a Bt5-billion profit as a result of Jor’s acts…”.

Gossip, innuendo and conspiracy

Gossip, innuendo and conspiracy (or “journalism” at The Nation)
August 20, 2009
About 10 days ago PPT blogged on The Nation’s remarkable plot story. There we said that some of its stories and columns would not qualify as journalism, pointing out that personal attacks and unsupported allegations have been too common.

The Nation editorial we commented on constructed a grand and imaginative conspiracy. To cut a long story short, it was claimed then that Thaksin Shinawatra, the red shirts, the supposed blue camp of General Pravit Wongsuwan and Army Chief General Anupong Paochinda, together with a few “suspect” privy councilors, were conspiring with police and traitors in the Democrat Party (most especially Deputy Premier Suthep Thaugsuban) in a behind-the-scenes power play against Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (who was allied with Sondhi Limthongkul and his People’s Alliance for Democracy) that would somehow use the Thaksin “royal pardon” petition and the predicted violence to do something…. maybe a “People’s Revolution” or a coup.

PPT saw no evidence for the claims made. We suggested that even if there was something to rumor and conspiracy theory, serious questions need to be asked of this style of “journalism.” PPT was left wondering why The Nation was intent on such tabloid journalism (a journalism that sensationalizes and exaggerates often using gossip, repeating scandal and relying on innuendo).

Now Thanong Khanthong, the Nation’s leading propagator of this style of “journalism,” gives its readers a new sensational read (21 August 2009: “One crisis averted; more to look forward to”). Apparently made breathless by his own conspiracy theories, Thanong claims that the “Abhisit government narrowly survived the crisis of the royal petition.” With the military was on full alert, the only thing that saved the government was that the damn red shirts were non-violent!

So what happened? The red shirts made “yet another attempt to intimidate the monarchy.” In fact, “the petition can be interpreted as nothing more than a sheer act of provocation and arrogance, with a hidden political agenda.” Hidden? Yes, because Thanong guesses that “the petition was designed as an act of provocation against the monarchy so that the military could have the justification to come out.

To justify an intervention, the military could have conveniently blamed the red shirts for committing lese majeste. The plot was very similar to an incident that sparked the violence of the October 6, 1976 tragedy at Thammasat University. If, after a gesture from some key red-shirt strategists, the military had come out, then the red shirts would have become the victims of military suppression.”

For Thanong, the “red shirts are easy pawns that can be sacrificed any time by their leaders, who selfishly crave a military intervention so that they can return to power.” More than this though, Thanong explains that the red shirt leaders were rewarded because they “got more than Bt1 billion for their labour and expenses in the royal petition operation.”
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